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TOWARD A NEW ETHICAL 
STANDARD REGULATING THE 
PRIVATE PRACTICE OF FORMER 
GOVERNMENT LAWYERS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the adoption of the Model Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility (MCPR) in 1969 by the American Bar Association 
(ABA), its ninth canon's admonition of avoiding the appearance 
of impropriety has been used to regulate the private practice of 
former government attorneys.l Because of the uncertainty of the 
actual prohibitions of the Disciplinary Rules of Canon 9, the 
federal common law on the disqualification of those attorneys is 
in a state of confusion and the bar has been unable to ade-
quately clarify the applicable code provisions for the courts and 
members of the bar.1 
In 1978 Congress identified conflict of interest situations for 
former government lawyers by passing the Ethics in Govern-
ment Act (the Act).8 The Act imposed criminal sanctions against 
former government lawyers· and created the Office of Govern-
1. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 9, DR9-10I(B) (1981). 
2. Armstrong v. McAlpin, 606 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1979), vacated en bane, 625 F.2d 433 
(2d Cir. 1980) vacated on other grounds, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981). See also Comment, Con-
flicts of Interest and the Former Government Attorney, 65 GEO. L.J. 1025 (1977); Note, 
Firm Disqualification and the Former Government Attorney: Armstrong v. McAlpin, 42 
OHIO ST. L.J. 579 (1981); Comment, The Chinese Wall Defense to Law-Firm Disqualifi-
cation, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 677 (1980). 
3. Pub. L. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (1978) as amended, Pub. L. 96-019, 93 Stat. 37 
codified in the following sequence: Title I-Amendments to 28 U.S.C. Special Prosecutor, 
28 U.S.C. ch. 39, §§ 591-598; Title II-Congressional Legal Counsel, 2 U.S.C. ch. 9D, § 288; 
Title III-Financial Disclosure, 5 U.S.C. ch. 18, §§ 701-709; Title IV-Office of Government 
Ethics, 5 U.S.C. App. I, §§ 401-405; Title V -Restrictions on Post-Service Activities by 
Officials and Employees of the Executive Branch, 18 U.S.C. ch. 11, § 207 and 28 U.S.C. § 
528, Disqualification of officers and employees of the Department of Justice. See for 
complete synopsis of the Act, 2 U.S.C. § 701 n. Short Title. 
4. 18 U.S.C. § 207 (Supp. 1983). 
433 
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ment Ethicsll to enforce a newly-drafted set of federal 
regulations. II 
This comment advocates the elimination of the "appearance 
of· impropriety" as a legal and ethical standard governing the 
disqualification of former government lawyers and urges the 
ABA to adopt Rule LIP of the proposed Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct.s Model Rule 1.11, Successive Government and 
Private Employment, provides a comprehensible, precise ethical 
rule regulating the post-government practice of lawyers in con-
formity with federal statute and regulation.s 
II. BACKGROUND 
The "revolving door" is a derisive term used to describe the 
practice of lawyers passing back and forth between government 
service and private practice. to After a number of years with the 
government, and having gained expertise. in a field, the revolving 
door lawyer represents clients before the agency in which the 
lawyer previously worked.ll Some revolving door lawyers begin 
5. 5 U.S.C. App. I § 401 (Supp. 1983). 
6. Regulations Concerning Past Employment Conflict of Interest, 5 C.F.R. § 737 
(1982). 
7. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.11 (Final Draft 1982), infra note 
97. 
8. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.11 (Final Draft 1982). 
9. [d. 
10. Lacovara, Restricting the Private Law Practice of Former Government Lawyers, 
20 ARIZ. L. REV. 369 (1978) [hereafter Restricting Private Practice.) 
This comment focuses on federal government lawyers, but similar ethical policies 
and rules apply to state and local lawyers. For state cases so holding, see City of Ho-
quiam v. Public Employment Relations Commission, 628 P.2d 1314 (1981) (involving 
DR9-101(B) and DR5-105(D»; State v. Nipps, 419 N.E.2d 1128 (1979) (upholding an 
Ohio criminal statute restricting private practice of a former Chief of the Department of 
Public Welfare). 
In 1980, there were approximately 17,300 lawyers employed in the executive agencies 
and departments of the federal government. U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, 
OCCUPATIONS OF FEDERAL WHITE COLLAR WORKERS, October 31, 1981 (Washington, D.C.; 
American Statistical Index 82 (1981) at 26). The lawyer turnover rate in federal agencies 
is more than twice that of the national average for private law firms. See Jenkins, Work-
ing for Uncle Sam; The Flyway Problem of Federal Attorneys, STUDENT LAW., Apr. 
1977, at 51. The government does not keep exact statistics on the federal turnover rate. 
However, the various agencies do record the percentages of attorneys who resign each 
year. [d. 
11. Restricting Private Practice, supra note 10, at 371; G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE 
PRACTICE OF LAW (1978). Professor Hazard discusses the advantages of entering the gov-
ernment at the beginning of a legal career at competitive salaries and with opportunities 
for more responsibility than lawyers in the private sector. [d. at 107. 
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their careers in the private sector and later move to the execu-
tive branch to serve for a period of time in the government. 12 
The ethical rule that evolved over the years forbids a former 
government lawyer from being involved in a matter for a private 
client, for which the attorney had responsibility while working 
for the government.18 The problem of the revolving door practice 
occurs when an apparent conflict of interest arises. This may 
warrant the disqualification of a former government lawyer or 
the firm with which the lawyer has become associated. I. 
The ABA regulates the conduct of former government law-
yers in Disciplinary Rule 9-101(B): "A lawyer shall not accept 
private employment in a matter in which he had substantial re-
sponsibility while he was a public employee. "111 The admonition 
of Canon 9, "A lawyer should avoid even the appearance of pro-
fessional impropriety,"18 coupled with the prohibition of DR9-
lOl(B), fail to provide clear ethical guidelines for the private 
practice of former government attorneys.17 
The federal courts employ DR9-101(B) of the MCPRI8 to 
12. Mundheim, Conflict of Interest and the Former Government Employee: Re-
thinking the Revolving Door, 14 CREIGHTON L. REV. 707 (1981) [hereafter Rethinking the 
Revolving Door.] 
13. G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 109 (1978). 
14. Id. at 110. There is a problem with identifying on what matter the former gov-
ernment lawyer worked. It may have been a lawsuit, contract negotiation, a policy or 
regulation, drafting the administration's legislative program, or lobbying a legislative· 
program. Factors considered are the duration of the lawyer's responsibility and type of 
office held. 
The problem becomes severe when disqualification takes the revolving door lawyer 
out of the job market or when the threat of disqualification forces the lawyer to become 
a lifetime career servant. Either possibility would prevent the government from at-
tracting competent lawyers. Id. at 112-114. 
15. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR9-101(B) (1981). 
16. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 9 (1981). All states except 
California and Georgia have adopted MCPR Canon 9 and DR9-101(B). See ABA Code of 
Professional Responsibility by State, NAT'L CENTER FOR PROF. RESPONSIBILITY (1980). 
Two articles present detailed analyses of federal cases on point: O'Toole, Canon 9 of the 
Code of Professional Responsibility: An Elusive Ethical Guideline, 62 MARQ. L. REV. 
313 (1979); Kramer, The Appearance of Impropriety Under Canon 9: A Study of the 
Federal Judicial Process Applied to Lawyers, 65 MINN. L. REV. 243 (1980). 
17. See supra note 2. 
18. The 1969 MCPR was essentially a redraft of the 1908 Canons of Professional 
Ethics. They were modeled from the 1887 Alabama Code of Ethics which was inspired by 
the 1850 Lectures of George Sharswood, a Philadelphia judge. Kutak, A Commitment to 
Clients and the Law, 68 A.B.A.J. 804, 805 (1982). 
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disqualify former government lawyers from litigating a matter in 
private practice.Ie The federal judiciary also applies DR9-101(B) 
to disqualify by imputation a law firm whose associate is a dis-
qualified former government lawyer under DR5-105(D).20 Case 
law has developed a prohibition against the "appearance of im-
propriety" as a rule to discipline former government attorneys in 
private practice. Since the ABA's adoption of the MCPR in 
1969, the "appearance of impropriety" has evolved into an inde-
pendent standard applied by federal judges to disqualify former 
government lawyers whether or not they have actually breached 
Canon 36 of the 1908 draft was the applicable ethical restriction preceding the 
Code's Canon 9 and DR9-101(B). Canon 36 stated: 
Retirement From Judicial Position or Public Employment 
A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in 
any matter upon the merits of which he has previously acted 
in a judicial capacity. 
A lawyer, having once held public office or, having been in 
the public employ, should not after his retirement accept em-
ployment in connection with any matter which he has investi-
gated or passed upon while in such office or employ. 
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1908). 
19. The genesis of this comment was a Motion for Disqualification in the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of California, CR-81-205-Misc. In that 
case, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 207 was charged in order to disqualify two recently re-
signed Strike Force attorneys who were hired to represent an unindicted defendant 
against charges of prostitution which had been under investigation during their tenure in 
the Department of Justice. These former government attorneys were disqualified for vio-
lating DR9-101(B)'s prohibition against the "appearance of impropriety." The evidence 
showed an actual conflict of interest and potential breach of confidentiality of govern-
ment information. 
This author has found no federal cases disqualifying former government attorneys 
for violating 18 U.S.C. § 207 (1982) or 5 C.F.R. § 737 (1982). 
The Disciplinary Rules of the MCPR are usually enforced by disqualifying an attor-
ney from representing a client. Professor Sutton, the reporter for the ABA Committee 
that drafted the MCPR in 1969, has said that the MCPR's Disciplinary Rules were 
drafted for use in disciplinary proceedings and were not intended to be procedural rules 
in civil or criminal cases. Sutton, How Vulnerable is the Code of Professional Responsi-
bility, 57 N.C.L. REV. 497, 514-15 (1979). Nevertheless, the courts have regularly used 
the disciplinary rules in disqualification motions. 
20. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR5-105(D) (1981) states: "If a 
lawyer is required to decline employment or to withdraw from employment under a Dis-
ciplinary Rule, no partner, no associate, or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his 
firm, may accept or continue such employment." See, United States v. Miller, 624 F.2d 
1198 (3d Cir. 1980). The circuit court upheld the district court's disqualification of a 
former Strike Force lawyer as well as the disqualification of his entire law firm. The 
court viewed the "appearance of impropriety" through the eyes of a hypothetical private 
person. But see Board of Education v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241 (2d Cir. 1979) (the court 
found that the appearance of impropriety was too slender a reed on which to grant a 
motion to disqualify an entire law firm); Kesselhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d 791 (Ct. 
C!. 1977) (screening procedures precluded disqualification of an entire law firm). 
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an ethical consideration of the MCPR or violated DR9-101(B)'s 
minimal standard of conduct.21 
After observing the catastrophic ramifications of firm dis-
qualification, the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional 
Responsibility (CEPR) issued Formal Opinion 342 (Opinion 
342) to interpret and limit the application of DR9-101(B)/~2 The 
CEPR concluded that the appearance of professional impropri-
ety was not a "standard, test, or element embodied in DR9-
101(B)."23 The committee said the" 'appearance of professional 
impropriety' was only a policy consideration supporting the exis-
tence of the Disciplinary Rule."24 As a practical alternative to 
firm disqualification, the CEPR recommended screening the dis-
qualified former government lawyer-associate and obtaining the 
government's waiver of the screening process. Unfortunately, 
Opinion 342 did not define with precision any test for the ap-
pearance of impropriety; rather, the committee gave examples of 
actual improper conflict of interest situations or of clear 
breaches of client confidentiality.211 
Opinion 342 represents the bar's formal position on ethical 
restraints of the practice of revolving door lawyers. The opinion 
addressed two issues: (1) what ethical considerations of the 
MCPR warrant disqualification of a former government lawyer 
under DR9-101(B)?; and, (2) should disqualification be imputed 
to a law firm whose associate is disqualified? Opinion 342 is the 
sole commentary from the bar on the ethical restrictions pre-
scribed by the MCPR on the private practice of former govern-
ment attorneys. Despite its limitation on DR9-101(B)'s applica-
21. Judge Kaufman, a leading authority in the field of legal ethics, described the 
policy in this context: an attorney must seek to avoid even the appearance of evil. See 
Kaufman, The Former Government Attorney and the Canons of Professional Ethics, 70 
HARV. L. REV. 657, 659 (1957). 
According to the federal courts, the MCPR places an ethical burden of avoiding the 
appearance of evil uniquely on former government attorneys. 
22. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 342 (1975). 
Formal opinions of the ABA's Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Re-
sponsibility are issued as interpretations of the MCPR. Formal Opinion 342 was an at-
tempt to limit the ramifications of strictly applying DR9-101(B) to disqualification of an 
entire law firm when one of its members was disqualified because of a conflict of interest. 
23. Id. at 3. 
24.ld. 
25. Id. at 9-11. See also Comment, Conflicts of Interest and the Former Govern-
ment Attorney, 65 GEO. L.J. at 1046. 
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bility to disqualification of former government lawyers and their 
law firms, the federal courts have generally ignored Opinion 342 
and have continued to disqualify on the basis of the "appear-
ance of impropriety."IIB 
In discussing ethical restrictions on the practice of former 
government lawyers, the CEPR in Opinion 342 briefly discussed 
the relevance of MCPR Canon 4'Sll7 mandate of preserving confi-
dentiality and Canon 5'S1l8 prohibition against lawyers' represen-
tation of differing interests. However, the focus of Opinion 342 
was its interpretation of Disciplinary Rule 9-101(B) in its appli-
cation to the disqualification of former government lawyers and 
law firms with which they become associated. First, the CEPR 
found that the drafters of the MCPR did not intend the "ap-
26. WestinghoU8e Electric Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221 (7th Cir. 1978) (cir-
cuit court disqualified on the possibility of an appearance of impropriety); WestinghoU8e 
Electric Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 
(1978) (trial court did not disqualify, but circuit court reversed on the grounds of an 
appearance of impropriety). 
27. "A Lawyer Should Preserve the Confidences and Secrets of a Client." MODEL 
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4 (1981). 
Under Canon 4, DR4-101(B) prohibits an attorney from revealing a confidence ei-
ther to the disadvantage of his client or to his own or a third person's advantage, unless 
the client consents after full disclosure. An attorney violates DR4-101(B) by knowingly 
revealing a confidence of a client or by U8ing such a confidence improperly. Judge Kauf-
man, in Emle Industries, Inc. v. Patentex Inc., 478 F.2d 652, 670 (2d Cir. 1973), de-
scribed the purpose of Canon 4 to encourage a client to discuss his problem freely and in 
depth. This prevents a client from fearing that "information he reveals to his lawyer on 
one day may be U8ed against him on the next." Emle emphasized the need to strictly 
enforce Canon 4 to prevent the possibility, however slight, that confidential information 
aCQuired from a client during a previoU8 relationship may be used subsequently to the 
client's disadvantage. Id. at 571. 
In the context of the revolving door, Canon 4's disciplinary rules protect the govern-
ment's need to preserve confidential information acquired by lawyers in federal agencies. 
The federal courts have enforced Canon 4's disciplinary provisions to disqualify former 
government lawyers in private practice when the circumstances reveal an apparent or 
actual conflict of interest violative of the government's privilege of confidentiality. Opin-
ion 342 explained that DR4-101(B) has been the basis for disqualifying former govern-
ment lawyers not because they actually breached the Rule, but 88 a prophylactic mea-
sure against a possible future violation. Formal Op. 342, supra note 22, at 2. 
28. "A Lawyer Should Exercise Independent Professional Judgment on Behalf of a 
Client." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 5 (1981). 
DR5-105(A) states: 
A lawyer shall decline proffered employment if the exercise of 
his independent professional judgment in behalf of a client 
will be or is likely to be adversely affected by the acceptance 
of the proffered employment, or if it would be likely to involve 
him in representing different interests, except to the extent 
permitted under DRS-I05(C). 
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pearance of professional impropriety" to be a standard, test or 
element embodied in DR9-101(B).29 According to the CEPR, the 
"appearance of professional impropriety" is only a policy consid-
eration supporting the disciplinary rule.80 The authors acknowl-
edged that: "The appearance of evil is only one of the underly-
ing considerations, however, and is probably not the most 
important reason for the creation and existence of the rule 
itself. "81 
Why then is DR9-101(B) included under Canon 9's prohibi-
tion against the appearance of professional impropriety? The 
committee listed the policy arguments justifying its position in 
Canon 9 as: (1) the treachery inherent in switching sides; (2) 
protection of confidential government information from use in 
future litigation against the government; (3) the need to discour-
age government lawyers from structuring their government ser-
vice to advance their own careers in the private sector; and (4) 
the benefit to the profession derived from avoiding the appear-
ance of evil. SI 
On the other hand, the CEPR recognized weighty policy ar-
guments against having a special disciplinary rule limiting the 
employment of former government lawyers in conjunction with 
Canon 9's "appearance of impropriety" standard. The argu-
ments given were that: (1) such a rule restricts the government's 
ability to recruit young professional and competent lawyers 
without penalizing them when they subsequently enter private 
practice; (2) disqualification motions often are a tool to delay 
29. Formal Op. 342, supra note 22, at 3. 
30. "DR9-101(B) is located under Canon 9 because the 'appearance of professional 
impropriety' is a policy consideration supporting the existence of the disciplinary rule." 
ld. 
31. [d. 
32. [d. at 3-4. The CEPR quotes Judge Winestein's comment in Silver Chrysler 
Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 370 F. Supp. 581 (E.D.N.Y. 1973): 
Defendants seem to suggest that the complexities of the fac-
tual determination to be made by this court should be avoided 
by a decision couched in notions of possible appearance of im-
propriety. On the contrary, the importance of the underlying 
policy considerations call for careful analysis of the matters 
embraced by previous and present litigations. Vague or indefi-
nite allegations do not suffice . . . . The danger of damage to 
public confidence in the legal profession would be great if we 
were to allow unfounded charges of impropriety to form the 
sole basis for an unjust disqualification. [d. at 589. 
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litigation and enhance counsel's prospects of winning by dispos-
ing of an opponent's competent counsel; and, (3) a litigant has a 
right to have counsel of choice, particularly in specialized areas 
of law.33 
In balancing the policy considerations of DR9-101(B)'s exis-
tence in Canon 9 of the MCPR, the authors of Opinion 342 con-
cluded that the rule should be given a narrow construction by 
the courts. Such construction would limit neither the govern-
ment's ability to recruit competent lawyers nor an individual's 
right to have counsel of his choice.34 The opinion also stated that 
firm disqualification was adverse to the government's interests 
to recruit qualified lawyers and the public's interest to obtain 
counsel of choice, particularly in specialized areas. 311 The authors 
limited the provision which could allow disqualification of an en-
tire firm when one of its attorneys was unable to appear as a 
representative against a former agency. 38 
Thus, the CEPR, without further reason, and in direct con-
tradiction to Canon 5's disciplinary rule l05(D), found that 
screening the disqualified former government lawyer from par-
ticipation in the matter, and from the firm's compensation gen-
erated from the matter, satisfied DR-I05(D). The committee 
also recommended that the government agency should approve 
or waive the screening of the disqualified former government 
33. Formal Op. 342, supra note 22, at 4-5. 
34. Id. at 11. 
35. "Only allegiance to form over substance would justify blanket application of 
DR5-105(D) in a manner that thwarts and distorts the policy considerations behind 
DR9-IOI(B)." Formal Op. 342, supra note 22, at 11. 
36. In 1974, the ABA amended DR5-105(D) to read: "If a lawyer is required to de-
cline employment or to withdraw from employment under a Disciplinary Rule, no part-
ner or associate, or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm may accept or con-
tinue such employment." 
Soon after this amendment, controversy arose as to the imputed disqualification of a 
law firm which had hired a former government lawyer who had switched sides and was 
thereby disqualified. See Kesselhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d 791 (Ct. Cl. 1977). Evi-
dently, the ABA had given no consideration to the impact of DR5-105(D) on the revolv-
ing door lawyer, his partners or associates. Restricting Priuate Practice, supra note 10, 
at 379. 
As stated, the CEPR attempted to limit DR5-105(D)'s application to DR9-101(B) in 
Opinion 342. Opinion 342 found that a disqualified former government attorney's law 
firm would not be disqualified if: (1) the disqualified former government lawyer was 
screened from participation in the action and from sharing in fees derived from the cli-
ent; and (2) the government agency or department were required to waive the screen. 
Formal Op. 342, supra note 22, at 11. 
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lawyer. Screening and waiver would fulfill the requirements of 
DR9-101(B) and not mandate an entire firm's disqualification 
when one of its associates was disqualified. 87 
In reaching this conclusion, the CEPR circumvented a lit-
eral reading of the MCPR. 88 The authors did not explain why 
DR5-105(D) is inapplicable to disqualify a law firm whose mem-
ber is disqualified by DR9-101(B). In a recent article,8e Profes-
sors Finman and Schneyer examined the CEPR's interpretation 
of the MCPR and criticized the CEPR's unexplained reading of 
the literal meaning of the disciplinary rules!O They charged that 
Opinion 342 was an attempt to rewrite the MCPR, not to inter-
pret it.41 In particular, the article discussed Opinion 342's disre-
gard of the "unambiguous command-the plain meaning-of 
DR5-105(D)"411 in disqualifying an entire law firm whose mem-
ber is a disqualified former government lawyer. In attempting to 
justify Opinion 342's failure to apply DR5-105(D), the authors 
speculate that the CEPR found that: "its gloss on the [Discipli-
nary Rules] is legitimate, because that gloss will decrease the 
undesirable consequences of disqualification without reducing 
the benefits that a literal reading would yield. ".8 
Thus, one must conclude, as did Professors Finman and 
Schneyer, that "for several reasons not mentioned in Opinion 
342, it is doubtful whether the values served by a literal reading 
[of the MCPR] would be as well protected by the CEPR's 
gloss."·· 
A literal reading of Opinion 342 also leads one to the con-
37. Formal Op. 342, supra note 22, at 11-12. 
38. The CEPR's conclusions on the enforcement of DR9-101(B) and DR5-105(D) 
are realistic and pragmatic, although not justified by reading the MCPR. 
39. Finman & Schneyer, The Role of Bar Association Ethics Opinions in Regulat-
ing Lawyer Conduct: A Critique of the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional 
Responsibility, 29 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 67, 141-144 (1981). 
40. ld. at 142. Addressing the question of DR5-105(D)'s applicability to the imputed 
disqualification of a law firm whose member is barred from participation by DR9-101{B), 
the authors stated: "The Code seems to allow only one answer: DR5-105{D) bars an en-
tire firm if any member is disqualified under 'a Disciplinary Rule'; a firm member barred 
by DR9-101{B) is disqualified by 'a Disciplinary Rule'; ergo the entire firm is barred." ld. 
at 141. 
41. ld. at 141. 
42.ld. 
43. ld. at 142. 
44.ld. 
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clusion that the ABA committee was unable to sustain DR9-
lOl(B),s inclusion in the MCPR under the maxim of Canon 9's 
avoidance of the appearance of impropriety. In fact, the commit-
tee affirmatively told the courts that the "appearance of profes-
sional impropriety" is not a standard embodied in DR9-101(B).411 
At most, the committee stated, the appearance of impropriety is 
a policy consideration which should be construed favorably not 
to disqualify a revolving door lawyer. 
Despite Opinion 342's narrow construction of DR9-101(B) 
and conclusion that the appearance of impropriety is no stan-
dard for its enforcement, the courts have relied on Canon 9 to 
disqualify former government lawyers and their law firms. The 
federal courts have enforced DR9-101(B) on a case by case basis. 
This has produced a broad, vague standard of the meaning of 
"appearance of professional impropriety," enforced with impre-
cise, subjective decisions.'6 This subjective method of interpreta-
tion of the "appearance of impropriety" gives government law-
yers, former government lawyers, and law firms wishing to hire 
government lawyers no reliable standard to guide post-govern-
ment conduct.47 
A leading case, General Motors Corp. v. City of New York,'8 
demonstrates the dilemma of the revolving door lawyer. A for-
mer Department of Justice attorney who had prosecuted an an-
titrust suit against General Motors was hired by the City of New 
York and assigned to represent it in a similar suit against Gen-
eral Motors. The court acknowledged that the attorney had not 
45. Formal Op. 342, supra note 22, at 3. 
46. Kramer, The Appearance of Impropriety Under Canon 9: A Study of the Fed-
eral Judicial Process Applied to Lawyers, 65 MINN. L. REV. 243 (1980); O'Toole, Canon 
9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: An Elusive Ethical Guideline, 62 MARQ. L. 
REV. 313 (1979). 
47. Kramer, supra note 46, at 244. Donald A. Farmer was formerly Director of the 
Bureau of International Aviation, United States Civil Aeronautics Board and prior to 
that Special Assistant to the Assistant Attorney General, and Trial Attorney, Antitrust, 
United States Department of Justice. He entered private practice in 1979 after ten years 
of government service. When questioned about the present rules and restrictions on the 
private practice of revolving door lawyers Mr. Farmer wrote that he believed them to be 
out of touch with reality and becoming further detached rather than less. His opinion is 
that the unfortunate result of all this is that many lawyers going through the revolving 
door do not even know what the rules are, much less comply with them. Letter of Donald 
A. Farmer, Jr. to Barbara Mance (August 27, 1982). 
48. 501 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1974). 
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changed sides, but still held that his representation in opposi-
tion to the defendant corporation violated the ethical precepts 
of Canon 9 and DR9-101(B). The court stated that the impropri-
ety involved the "possibility that a lawyer might wield govern-
ment power with a view toward subsequent private gain. "49 As a 
result, the court disqualified the former justice department law-
yer even though he had not switched sides or sought employ-
ment with the City of New York while working as a federal pros-
ecutor. The standard which evolved from this case was the 
"possibility" of impropriety, one even more nebulous and 
ephemeral than "appearance of impropriety." 
The Ninth Circuit, in In Re Coordinated Pretrial Proceed-
ings in Petroleum Products Antitrust Litigation,IIO held that Ca-
non 9 would be stripped of its meaning and significance if it 
were not separately enforced to disqualify former government 
attorneys in private practice. III The court determined that since 
it is instructed to safeguard the integrity of the judicial process 
in the eyes of the public,1I2 Canon 9 must be a sufficient ground 
for disqualification. The Ninth Circuit further reasoned that its 
responsibility of controlling the conduct of attorneys who ap-
peared before the court justified its ability to disqualify attor-
neys for actual conduct that impugns the integrity of the court 
or for conduct that appears to be improper. liS 
49. rd. at 650 n. 20. The court believed that this violation of Canon 9 and DR9-
101(B) was justified because "there lurks great potential for lucrative returns in follow-
ing into private practice the course already charted with the aid of government re-
sources." rd. Cf, United States v. Standard Oil Co., 136 F. Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) 
where in a similar fact situation no appearance of evil was found. 
50. 658 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1981). 
51. rd. at 1360. 
52. See United Sewerage Agency, Etc. v. Jelco, 646 F.2d 1339 (9th Cir. 1981). 
53. 658 F.2d 1360-61. The Ninth Circuit's decision is in direct conflict with the bar's 
official position in Opinion 342. According to O'Toole, Canon 9 of the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility: An Elusive Ethical Guideline, 62 MARQ. L. REV. 313 (1979), three 
basic issues are raised by Canon 9's application to disqualify former government 
attorneys: 
First, is Canon 9 intended to be used within the context of 
litigation or is it only intended to serve as an axiomatic guide-
line to the praticing attorney? Second, from whose perspective 
is the propriety of appearances measured? Third, can im-
proper appearances alone suffice to trigger disqualification of 
opposing counsel? 
rd. at 318. The author terms the application of Canon 9 a murky subject of legal ethics 
and raises the example of a court's disqualifying an attorney even in an instance when 
Canon 9 had not been explored in briefs addressing the motion. rd. citing Richardson v. 
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A recent case from the Second Circuit, Armstrong v. 
McAlpin,1I4 demonstrates the state of confusion that exists when 
federal courts enforce DR9-101(B) of the present MCPR. In 
McAlpin, Theodore Altman, a former Assistant Director of the 
Division of Enforcement of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC) became a partner in a private law firm, the 
Gordon Firm. At the SEC Altman had had supervisory and "di-
rect, personal involvement"lIlI in the investigation of Clovis 
McAlpin. The SEC filed a complaint against McAlpin for securi-
ties violations. Subsequently, Altman left the SEC to join the 
Gordon firm. At that time the Gordon firm was not involved in 
the prosecution of McAlpin. 
Armstrong was appointed receiver in the action, and the 
SEC made its investigatory files available to him. Armstrong was 
forced to seek new counsel in the action and consulted one of 
the partners of the Gordon firm about his retaining the firm. 
The court approved the appointment of the Gordon firm, pro-
vided that Altman, who was clearly disqualified,1I6 was properly 
screened. The SEC waived any objection. Armstrong filed an ac-
tion against McAlpin for fraud and damages of $24,000,000. The 
defendant moved to disqualify the Gordon firm on the ground 
that Altman's disqualification should be imputed to the entire 
Gordon firm. The district court denied the motion.1I7 
The Second Circuit Court reversed and found that disquali-
fication of the firm necessary "as a prophylactic measure to 
guard against misuse of authority by government lawyers."118 
Upon rehearing, the court reversed because there had been no 
Hamilton International Corp., 469 F.2d 1382 (3d Cir. 1972). 
A number of courts have held that Ethical Consideration 9:3 and DR9-101(B) apply 
even where a former government lawyer's representation of a private client does not im-
pugn the position she took in a particular matter while in public employment. This was 
the court's belief in General Motors, supra note 50. 
Ethical Consideration 9:3 states: "After a lawyer leaves judicial office or other public 
employment, he should not accept employment in connection with any matter in which 
he had substantial responsibility prior to his leaving, since to accept employment would 
give the appearance of impropriety even if none exists." 
54. 625 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980), vacated on other grounds, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981). 
55. 606 F.2d 28, 29 (2d Cir. 1979), vacated and remanded, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981). 
56. The trial court disqualified him under DR9-10I(B). 625 F.2d at 442. 
57. [d. at 443. 
58. 606 F.2d at 34. 
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threat to the integrity of the trial processll9 due to: (1) the 
screening of Altman;80 (2) the routine turnover of SEC files to 
Armstrong before he retained the Gordon firm; and, (3) the ab-
sence of any indication that the receiver came to the firm 
through or because of Altman's connection.81 
The circuit court concluded that disqualification of the firm 
could only be based on the appearance of impropriety stemming 
from Altman's association with the firm. The court balanced the 
appearance of impropriety against the plaintiffs' interest in pro-
ceeding and redress of the alleged frauds and concluded that the 
Gordon firm must not be barred from the action.811 The court 
followed a practical, narrow construction of the appearance of 
impropriety by finding that: "[u]nder the circumstances, the 
possible 'appearance of impropriety is simply too slender a reed 
on which to rest a disqualification order . . . particularly . . . 
where ... the appearance of impropriety is not very clear.' "88 
In Greitzer & Locks v. Johns-Manville,84 a case involving a 
former government lawyer who specialized in asbestosis litiga-
tion, a majority of the Fourth Circuit found the particular firm's 
shielding provisions to be adequate. These included prohibiting 
the former justice department lawyer "from working, advising or 
participating, indirectly, by discovery, analysis or otherwise [in 
the actions in dispute] . . . He was to be denied access to the 
files and prohibited from sharing profits derived from the . . . 
cases. "811 The majority relied on Opinion 342, rejecting a literal 
59. 625 F.2d at 445. 
60. ld. The case. therefore. is entirely distinguishable from General Motors. 501 
F.2d 639. The court did not scrutinize the screening provisions since the SEC had found 
them satisfactory. 
61. ld. 
62. ld. at 446. 
63. ld. at 445. quoting Board of Education v. Nyquist. 590 F.2d 1241. 1247 (2d Cir. 
1979). The court also said that absent a threat of taint to the trial. ethical conflicts are 
better addressed by the disciplinary machinery of the state and federal bar or by legisla-
tion such as 18 U.S.C. § 207. 625 F.2d at 441. 
64. No. 81-1379. slip op. (4th Cir. March 5. 1982). 
65. No. 81-1379. slip op. at 6-7 (4th Cir. March 5. 1982). The courts are more ame-
nable to finding that a "Chinese Wall" was erected in the screening mechanism in Canon 
9 cases than in situations where a p08Bible violation of Canon 4 or Canon 5 has or will 
occur. Courts will consider policy arguments for not disqualifying a law firm that has 
hired a former government attorney. See Kesselhaut v. United States. 555 F.2d 791. 793 
(Ct. Cl. 1977) (The court held that a former government lawyer would take on the status 
of Typhoid Mary and be reduced to sole practice under the most unfavorable condi-
13
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interpretation of the MCPR. The majority opinion deferred to 
the justice department's approval of the disqualified former gov-
ernment lawyer's firm's screening measures and stated that the 
"affected client agencies of the government are the best judges 
of the suitability of screens erected to protect them from disclos-
ures of confidences and secrets."ss More importantly, the major-
ity cited Rule 1.11 of the ABA Proposed Final Draft of the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct which eliminates the "ap-
pearance of professional impropriety" standard governing the 
disqualification of former government lawyers.s7 
III. FEDERAL LAW GOVERNING THE PRIVATE PRACTICE OF FOR 
MER GOVERNMENT LA WYERS 
Congress has enacted legislation to regulate the private 
practice of former government lawyers. As stated in the legisla-
tive history, the purpose of the 1978 Ethics in Government Act 
was to enforce and reform the ethical standards governing the 
post-government employment of present and former federal offi-
cials in the executive branch of the government.S8 Federal offi-
tions.). Comment, Chinese Wall Defense to Law-Firm Disqualification, 128 U. PA. L. 
REV. 677, 693 (1980). 
66. No. 81-1379, slip op. at 10 (4th Cir. March 5, 1982). 
67. [d. 
68. For the legislative history and purpose of the Act, see S. REP. No. 170, 95th 
Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in part in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 4216 and H.R. 
REP. No. 115, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 328. 
According to S. REP. No. 170 at 4217: "The purpose of this legislation [Ethics in Govern-
ment Act) is to preserve and promote the accountability and integrity of public officials 
and of the institutions of the Federal Government and to invigorate the Constitutional 
separation of powers between the three branches of government." 
The Act originated as the Public Officials Integrity Act of 1977, S. 403-7, sponsored 
by the eleven-member Senate Committee on Government Affairs. The Act consists of 
five sections, but only sections four and five regulate the revolving door lawyer/employee 
problem. Section four, Title IV, created the Office of Government Ethics. 
According to the UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HANDBOOK, THE OFFICE OF GOVERN-
MENT ETHICS, 1981-82 at 600, Title IV has the responsibility to develop and to recom-
mend, to the Office of Per~onnel Management and the Attorney General, rules and regu-
lations concerning conflicts of interest and ethics in the executive branch. These rules 
and regulations are promulgated by the Office of Personnel Management and codified at 
5 C.F.R. § 737 (1982). 
The Office also was established to monitor, investigate, and enforce compliance with 
the conflict of interest and public financial disclosure laws and regulations. 1978 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS at 4264. (S. REP. No. 170 at 148.) See Duplantier V. United 
States, 606 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1076 (1981). (Upholding the 
constitutionality of 28 U.S.C. app. §§ 301·309 (Judicial Personnel Financial Disclosure 
Requirements». 
The Office also has the responsibility to promote an understanding of the ethical 
14
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cials covered by the Act are lawyers and other professionals, in-
cluding military personnel, who serve in executive departments 
and agencies. 
Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations section 737 pro-
hibits a former government lawyer's representation of a private 
client involving a conflict of interest. Section 737.5(a) prohibits a 
former government attorney from ever representing a person in 
any informal or formal appearance before the United States 
courts in connection with any particular government matter in-
volving a specific party in which matter he or she participated 
personally and substantially as a government employee.8s "Per-
sonal" participation means direct involvement and includes the 
participation of a subordinate when actually directed by the for-
mer government employee.'o "Substantial" means that the attor-
standards in the executive agencies so that employees will know of the procedures in-
volved and of any changes in the laws or regulations. 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 
at 4263. The Director refers problems to the Department of Justice for disciplinary pro-
ceedings. S. REP. No. 170 at 146-48. 
The President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoints the Director of 
the Office of Government Ethics. 5 U.S.C. app. I § 401 codifies his functions. According 
to the San Francisco Chronicle, August 14, 1982, at 8 Col. 3 "The first director of the 
Office of Government Ethics, J. Jackson Walter, is resigning because of the wide-ranging 
controversies involving the enforcement of the financial disclosure regulations of the Act. 
High-level officials, members of Congress, and federal judges have refused to forthrightly 
comply with the Act's provisions." The Chronicle pointed out that the director does not 
have the power to impose sanctions if he does not approve an incumbent official's 
financial statement. Also the director has no authority to audit financial forms. Accord-
ing to Walter, his main· role was to write advisory opinions for companies on the propri-
ety of former government employees' passage through the revolving door. 
Section five, Title V, of the Act, sets forth the laws restricting the post-service activ-
ities by officials and employees of the executive agencies and departments. The Act 
amended and expanded the criminal penalties imposed on disqualified former govern-
ment lawyers in 18 U.S.C. § 207 (1979). "But Title V does more than establish a crime 
and provide for administrative discipline: it is also a general standard for what is to be 
considered proper ethical conduct by former government officials . . . . In short it is a 
statement of federal policy on this aspect of conflict of interest." S. REp. No. 170 at 31-
32. 
69. 5 C.F.R. § 737.5(a) (1982). Section 737.5(b) explains the prohibition with an 
illustration: 
The target of this provision is the former employee who par-
ticipates in a particular matter while employed by the Govern-
ment and later "switches sides" by representing another per-
son on the same matter. 
Example 1: A lawyer in the Department of Justice person-
ally works on an antitrust case involving Q Company. After 
leaving the Department, he is asked by Q Company to rep-
resent it in that case. He may not do so. 
70. 5 C.F.R. § 737.5(d)(l) (1982). 
15
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ney's involvement must be of significance to the matter, or form 
a basis for a reasonable appearance of such significance.71 While 
a series of peripheral involvements may be insubstantial, a single 
act of approval or participation in a critical step may be a sub-
stantial act. 72 
Further, one's governmental (official) responsibility may 
contribute to the substantiality of an employee's participation. 
If an employee has responsibility for review of a matter "and 
action cannot be undertaken over his or her objection, the result 
may be different. If the employee reviews a matter and passes it 
on, his or her participation may be regarded as 'substantial' even 
if he or she claims merely to have engaged in inaction. "73 
The rules of the Office of Government Ethics specifically de-
fine "the same particular matter" as one involving the "same ba-
sic facts, related issues, the same or related parties, time 
elapsed, the same confidential information, and the continued 
existence of an important Federal interest."74 The particular 
matter must be one in which the United States is a party or has 
an interest in, and the importance of the federal interest is a 
determining factor.711 
71. Id. "Example 2: A Government lawyer is not in charge of, nor has official respon-
sibility for a particular case, but is frequently consulted as to filings, discovery, and strat-
egy. Such an individual has personally and substantially participated in the matter." 
72. Id. 
73. Id. at § 737.5(d)(3) (1982). 
74. Id. at § 737.5(c)(4) (1982). One example illustrative of the "same particular mat-
ter" given here is: 
Id. 
A Government employee reviewed and approved certain wire-
tap applications. The prosecution of a person overheard dur-
ing the wiretap, although not originally targeted, must be re-
garded as part of the same particular matter as the initial 
wiretap application. The reason is that the validity of the 
wiretap may be put in issue and many of the facts giving rise 
to the wiretap application would be involved. 
75. Id. at § 737.5(c)(5) Example 1 (1982): 
Example 1: An attorney participated in preparing the Govern-
ment's antitrust action against Z Company. After leaving the 
Government, she may not represent Z Company in a private 
antitrust action brought against it by X Company on the same 
facts involved in the Government action. Nor may she rep-
resent X Company in that matter. The interest of the United 
States in preventing both inconsistent results and the appear-
ance of impropriety in the same factual matter involving the 
same party, Z CQmpany, is direct and substantial. However, if 
16
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In addition to the life-time ban on a matter in which the 
government lawyer participated personally and substantially, 
section 737.7(a) imposes a two year prohibition on a former gov-
ernment lawyer's participation in a matter in private practice 
which was pending under his or her responsibility one year 
before leaving government service.76 For any possible violation 
of these regulations, the Office of Government Ethics may initi-
ate disciplinary proceedings.77 
Title V of the Ethics in Government Act amended 18 U.S.C. 
section 207, the criminal statute proscribing unlawful appear-
ances or conduct of former government lawyers representing pri-
vate clients on a matter in which they participated as a govern-
ment employee.76 Amended section 207 penalizes former 
government lawyers for participating in three specific conflict of 
interest contexts.79 Professor Mundheim has summarized the re-
the Government's antitrust investigation or CBBe is closed, the 
United States no longer hBB a direct and substantial interest 
in the CBBe. 
76. 5 C.F.R. § 737.7(a)(1982). 
77. 5 U.S.C. app. I § 401. 
78. Disqualification of former officers and employees; disqualification of partners of 
current officers and employees. 18 U.S.C. § 207, BB amended, Pub. L. No. 95-521, Title V, 
§ 501(a), (1978), Pub. L. No. 96-28, §§ I, 2 (1979). First, the 1978 amendments to § 207 
expanded the lifetime ban to formal or "informal appearances" or "with the intent to 
influence" or make "any oral or written communication" in a matter in which an official 
participated personally and substantially involving a specific party or parties with whom 
the United States or the District of Columbia hBB a direct and substantial interest. Sec-
ond, subsection (b) WBB amended from a one year to a two year ban on activity (formal 
or informal, or with the intent to influence, make any oral or written communication) 
actually pending under the official's responsibility within a period of one year prior to 
the termination of his responsibility. Third, subsections (c) and (d) place a new one year 
restriction on former high level officials from appearing before the department or agency 
in which they served. 1979 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS, supra note 31, at 330. 
79. The pertinent sections of 18 U.S.C. § 207 are BB follows: 
(a) Whoever, having been an officer or employee of the execu-
tive branch of the United States Government, of any indepen-
dent agency of the United States, or of the District of Colum-
bia, including a special Government employee, after his 
employment hBB· ceBBed, knowingly acts BB agent or attorney 
for, or otherwise, represents, any other person (except the 
United States), in any formal or informal appearance before, 
or, with the intent to influence, makes any oral or written 
communication on behalf of any other person (except the 
United States) to-
(1) any department, agency, court, court-martial, or any 
civil, military, or naval commission of the United States or the 
District of Columbia, or any officer or employee thereof, and 
17
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vised statute as follows: 
First, it bars a former Government employee 
from ever making an appearance before or a com-
munication to a court or agency on behalf of a 
party in a particular matter in which he partici-
pated personally and substantially while in gov-
ernment service. Under the Act the former gov-
ernment employee can advise, counselor assist in 
a matter on which he switched sides so long as he 
himself avoids appearing or communicating. 
Second, the Act places a two-year ban on ap-
pearing before or communicating with a court or 
agency on behalf of a party in a particular matter 
which was pending under the employee's official 
responsibility in his last year of government ser-
vice. Like the first ban, it does not ban advising, 
(2) in connection with any judicial or other proceeding, 
application, request for a ruling or other determination, con-
tract, claim, controversy, investigation, charge, accusation, ar-
rest, or other particular matter involving a specific party or 
parties in which the United States or the District of Columbia 
is a party or has a direct and substantial interest, and 
(3) in which he participated personally and substantially 
as an officer or employee through decision, approval, disap-
proval, recommendation, the rendering of advice, investigation 
or otherwise, while so employed; or 
(b) Whoever, (i) having been so employed within two years af-
ter his employment has ceased, knowingly acts as agent or at-
torney for, or otherwise represents, any other person (except 
the United States), in any formal or informal appearance 
before, or, with the intent to influence, makes any oral or writ-
ten communication on behalf of any other person (except the 
United States) to, or (ii) having been so employed and as spec-
ified in sub-section (d) of this section, within two years after 
his employment has ceased, knowingly represents or aids, 
counsels, advises, consults, or assists in representing any other 
person (except the United States) by personal presence at any 
formal or informal appearance before-
(1) any department, agency, court, court-martial, or any 
civil, military or naval commission of the United States or the 
District of Columbia, or any officer or employee thereof, and 
(2) in connection with any judicial, rule-making, or other 
proceeding, application, request for a ruling or other determi-
nation contract, claim, controversy, investigation, charge, ac-
cusation, arrest, or other particular matter, and 
(3) which is pending before such department or agency or 
in which such department or agency has a direct and substan-
tial interest-shall be fined not more than $10,000 or impris-
oned for not more than two years, or both. 
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assisting, counseling or consulting behind the 
scenes. 
Third, the Act also imposes a one-year ban 
on senior government officials from appearing 
before their former agencies on any matter, in-
cluding new matters . . . . 
It does not preclude the senior officials from giv-
ing advice behind the scenes, because it is not his 
knowledge, but the possible undue influence asso-
ciated with use of his name which is sought to be 
restricted.80 
451 
The statute's effects are to eliminate offiCial corruption, to in-
sure that former government lawyers will not exercise undue in-
fluence over former colleagues, and to encourage officials to scru-
tinize their subsequent activities as private citizens with a higher 
degree of caution.81 Although section 207 is a criminal statute, it 
was passed to provide a general standard for proper ethical con-
duct for former government officials and as a model for agency 
and department regulations.81 
At the time of its enactment in 1978, the Senate Report 
conceded that public confidence in government had been weak-
ened "by a wide-spread conviction that federal officials use fed-
eral office for personal gain, particularly after they leave govern-
ment service. "88 The Senate committee stated that the public 
suspiciously viewed the revolving door between industry and 
government thereby eroding confidence in the integrity of the 
federal government.84 
On the other hand, the legislative history of the statute 
reveals that Congress recognized weighty public policy reasons 
mandating the government's ability to attract and hire qualified, 
talented individuals for executive service. In 1979, when section 
207 was amended,811 heads of various executive departments tes-
SO. Mundheim, Rethinking the RelJollJing Door, supra note 12, at 714. Reference is 
made to §§ 207(a), 207(b)(3), 207(b)(i), 207(c). See 1978 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & AD. NEWS 
4216, 4263ff. for a detailed explanation of 18 U.S.C. § 207(a)(b) & (c). 
81. 1978 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & AD. NEWS at 4247. 
82. Id. at 4248. 
83.Id. 
84.Id. 
85. H.R. REP. No. 115 cited in 1979 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & AD. NEWS 328. 330-333. 
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tified that: (1) movement back and forth from private industry 
to government is valuable to the individual and allows the gov-
ernment to recruit talented employees;88 (2) if such movement 
were restricted by an ambiguous and harsh statute, the civil ser-
vice would become a stagnant bureaucracy isolated from the en-
ergy of outsiders and fresh competition;87 and, (3) the govern-
ment must balance its interest with those of affected individuals 
whose career options upon leaving government service would be 
severely restricted.88 
IV. PROPOSED ABA REGULATION OF THE PRIVATE PRACTICE OF 
FORMER GOVERNMENT LAWYERS 
The ABA Commission on Evaluation of Professional Stan-
dards (the Kutak Commission)88 has recommended the bar's 
adoption for the Proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
(MRPC)80 including proposed Rule 1.11, entitled Successive 
Government and Private Employment. 81 The Kutak Commis-
86. 1d. at 331. Testimony of former Deputy Secretary of Defense Charles W. 
Duncan, Jr.: 
1d. at 332. 
Moreover, a law which discourages movement between the pri-
vate and public sector would further isolate dedicated career 
civil servants from other citizens at a time when alienation be-
tween Government and the tax-paying public is eroding faith 
in our national institutions. Our Government has long bene-
fited from the mix of career ~d short-term employees in its 
service, and this committee believes that the interchange this 
provides with the private sector must be preserved. 
87. 1d. at 331. The House Committee noted the importance of attracting individuals 
from the private sector for limited periods of time who would challenge the conventional 
wisdom of their superiors, knowing that they can readily find private employment if nec-
eSBarY. 1d. at 332. 
88. 1d. Testimony of former chairman Charles Curtis of the Federal Energy Regula-
tory Commission. 
89. The ABA Commission of Evaluation of Professional Standards is chaired by 
Robert J. Kutak. It should be noted that Mr. Kutak chairs a commission, not a standing 
committee of the ABA, and the commission includes non-lawyers. The commission was 
appointed in 1977 by the then ABA President William B. Spann, Jr. It was charged with 
undertaking a comprehensive rethinking of ethics of the profession of law. MODEL RULES 
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Proposed Final Draft 1981, Chairman's Introduction. 
90. American Bar Association, Materials on Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 
v. I, ANNUAL MEETING 1982, San Francisco, California. See also Kutak, A Commitment 
to Clients and the Law, 68 A.B.A.J. 804 (1982). 
91. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.11 Successive Government and 
Private Employment (Final Draft 1982) reads: 
(a) Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer 
shall not represent a private client in connection with a matter 
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sion's draft has eliminated Canon 9's ethical dominion over the 
private practice of former government lawyers and has stream-
lined the rules governing disqualification imputed to a law firm 
in which the lawyer participated pereonally and substantially 
as a public officer or employee, unless the appropriate govern-
ment agency consents after consultation. No lawyer in a firm 
with which that lawyer is associated may undertake or con-
tinue representation in the matter unless: 
(1) The disqualified laywer is screened from any 
participation in the matter and is apportioned no part 
of the fee therefrom; and 
(2) Written notice is promptly given to the appro-
priate government agency to enable it to ascertain com-
pliance with the provisions of this rule. 
(b) Except as law may otherwise expreaely permit. a law-
yer who has knowledge, acquired as a public officer or em-
ployee, of confidential government information about a per-
eon, may not represent a private client whose interests are 
adverse to that pereon in a matter in which the information is 
material. No lawyer in a firm with which that lawyer is aeeoci-
ated may undertake or continue representation in the matter 
unless: 
(1) The disqualified lawyer is ecreened from any 
participation in the' matter and is apportioned no part 
of the fee therefrom; and 
(2) Written notice is promptly given to the adverse 
party to enable that pereon to ascertain compliance 
with the provisions of this rule. 
(c) Except as law may otherwise expreaely permit, a law-
yer serving as a public officer or employee shall not: 
(1) Participate in a matter. in which the lawyer 
participated pereonally and substantially while in pri-
vate practice or nongovernmental employment, unleea 
under applicable law no one is, or by lawful delegation 
may be, authorized to act in the lawyer's ltead in the 
matter; or 
(2) Negotiate for private employment with any per-
eon who is involved as a party or as attorney for a party 
in a matter in which the lawyers is participating pereon-
ally and substantially. 
(d) As used in this rule, the term "matter" includes: 
(1) Any judicial or other proceeding, application, 
request for a ruling or other determination, contract. 
claim, controversy, investigation, charge, accusation, ar-
rest or other particular matter involving a specific party 
or parties; and 
(2) Any other matter covered by the conflict of in-
terest rules of the appropriate government agency. 
(e) As used in this rule, the term "confidential govern-
ment information" means information which, at the time this 
rule is applied, the government is prohibited by law from dis-
closure to the public or has a legal privilege not to disclose. 
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where members are disqualified former government lawyers. 
Proposed Rule 1.11 is based substantially on the federal law of 
the Ethics in Government Act and recognizes the controlling 
regulations proscribing conflicts of interest.811 
Rule 1.11 is designed to integrate in organization and sub-
stance with other rules defining the duties of the client-lawyer 
relationship, specifically Rule 1.9, Conflict of Interest: Former 
Client, and Rule 1.10, Imputed Disqualification: General Rule. lla 
As stated by Chairman Robert Kutak: "The overriding objective 
of the Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards dur-
ing these past five years has been to develop professional stan-
dards that are comprehensive, consistent, constitutional, and, 
most important, congruent with other law of which they are a 
part.'''' 
With no admonition of avoiding the appearance of profes-
sional impropriety, Rule 1. 11 (a) begins: "Except as law may oth-
erwise expressly permit, a lawyer shall not represent a private 
client in connection with a matter in which the lawyer partici-
pated personally and substantially as a public officer or em-
ployee . . . . "811 
This prohibition is similar to DR9-101(B)'s prohibition that 
a "lawyer shall not accept private employment in a matter in 
which he had substantial responsibility while he was a public 
employee.''" Rule 1.11 specifically stated "personal" participa-
tion by the former government lawyer and offers a more con-
crete standard consistent with federal statute and regulation. 
The requirement of personal participation enables a former gov-
ernment lawyer to know when post-government representation 
92. Proposed Rule 1.11 defen to law regulating the private practice of fonner gov-
ernment Iawyen. The 1969 MCPR did not parallel federal statutes. See Proposed Rule 
1.11 Comment, 68 A.B.A.J. 1331, 1410 (1982). 
93. Kutalt, The New Model Rules of Professional Conduct, A Report to the Bar, 68 
A.B.A.J. 1019, 1023 (1982). Mr. Kutak has pointed out that the organizational fonnat of 
the rules is a legislative one rather than one composed of canons, ethical considerations 
and aspirations. See also Kutalt, The Next Step in Legal Ethics: Some Observations 
about the Proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 30 CATH. U.L. REV. I, 5 
(1980). 
94. See note 93 supra, Kutak, The New Model Rules of Professional Conduct, A 
Report to the Bar at 1023. 
95. MODEL RULBS 0' PRoPE8SIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.11 (Final Draft 1982). 
96. MODEL CODE 0' PBOPE8SIONAL REsPONsm1L1TY DR9-101(b) (1981). 
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is barred. 
The term "matter" is defined in subsection (d)(l) as a judi-
cial proceeding, application, request for a ruling or other deter-
mination, contract, claim, controversy, investigation, charge, ac-
cusation, arrest or other particular matter involving a specific 
party or parties; or in (d)(2) any other conflict of interest matter 
covered by the appropriate government agency.S? Rule 1. 11 (a) is 
a comprehensive improvement of DR9-101(B) since the old rule 
never addresses the specifics of the term. 
The proposed rule provides for a permanent ban on an indi-
vidual lawyer's participation on a matter in which he was per-
sonally and substantially responsible unless the appropriate gov-
ernment agency consents to the participation. The rule also 
disqualifies firms if: (1) the disqualified former government law-
yer is not screened from participation in the matter or from any 
part of the fees; and, (2) written notice is not given promptly to 
the appropriate government agency to enable it to ascertain 
compliance with the screening mechanism.ss The Rule' adopts 
the screening device sanctioned by Opinion 342 to bar firm dis-
qualification, but does not mandate agency waiver, rather agency 
"compliance." Thus, Rule 1.11 fulfills the Greitzer majority's be-
lief that a government agency is the best judge of the suitability 
of screens erected to protect it from disclosure of confidential 
information. ee 
These proposed prOVISIons governing disqualification im-
puted to a law firm are important additions to the ABA ethical 
code. Subsections (a)(l) and (a)(2) remedy the 1969 Code's fail-
ure to deal with the realities of modern law practice.loo It is es-
sential that the ABA establish clear, workable rules for the re-
97. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUCT Rule 1.11 (Final Draft 1982). 
98. Id. at (a)(I), (a)(2). The screening and agency approval provisions are in con-
formity with the recent order of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals of April 30, 
1982, which also eliminated the waiver requirement of the federal agency but required 
filings by firm associates. (Memorandum of David B. Isbell to D.C. Bar Board of Gover-
nors: The Final Spin of the "Revolving Door": The D.C. Court of Appeals' Order of April 
30, 1982, at 6.) (Letter of Philip A. Lacovara to Barbara Mance, (July 26, 1982». 
99. See notes 93-95, supra. 
100. Kutak, The Next Step in Legal Ethics, Some Observations about the Proposed 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 30 CATH. U.L. REV. at 3. Mr. Kutak cbaracterized 
the 1969 Code as conceiving of the practice of law as it was in downstate Dlinois of the 
1860's. 
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volving door lawyer and prospective law firms which hire 
revolving door lawyers. The legislative history of the 1978 Ethics 
in Government Act reveals that Congress refrained from ad-
dressing this issue of disqualification imputed to a law firm and 
implicitly left it to the legal profession to self-regulate.lol 
The proposed rule will provide the courts with standards to 
measure the conflict of interest inherent in the revolving door 
situation, give agencies the opportunity to maintain confidential-
ity, and give private firms a way to determine when one of their 
attorneys who has been hired from the government will be able 
to operate without fear of disqualification. No longer will the 
federal courts have the "appearance of professional impropriety" 
as a standard to disqualify a law firm whose member is person-
ally disqualified. lOll 
The comment to Rule 1.11 discusses the policy arguments in 
support of the screening and agency approval provisions of the 
proposed rule. loa Not only is the government's need to attract 
highly qualified lawyers legitimate, it is necessary to sustain a 
democratic government system which competes with private in-
dustry. For that reason, the comment determines that it would 
101. S. REP. No. 170, supra note 68, at 149. 
102. Letter from Philip A. Lacovara to Barbara Mance (August 16, 1982). Mr. Laco-
vara predicted that, even though the proposed Model Rules have eliminated the "ap-
pearance of impropriety" as a textual basis for disqualification of former government 
lawyers, that standard may yet survive in disqualification motions. The argument will be 
that the "appearance of impropriety" standard is a general principle of professional be-
havior which the courts have inherent power to administer. To support his contention, 
see Gas-a-tron v. Union Oil Co., 534 F.2d 1322, 1324 (9th Cir. 1976) quoting Rich8rdson 
v. Hamilton International Corp., 469 F.2d 1382, 1385-86, (3d Cir. 1972): 
Whenever an allegation is made that an attorney has violated. 
his moral and ethical responsibility, an important question of 
profeBBional ethics is raised. It is the duty of the district court 
to examine the charge, since it is that court which is author-
ized to supervise the conduct of the members of its bar. The 
courts, as well as the bar, have a responsibility to maintain 
public confidence in the legal profeBBion. This means that a 
court may disqualify an attorney for not only acting improp-
erly but also for failing t() avoid the appearance of 
impropriety. 
. . . (T]he regulation of attorneys appearing before the 
district court in these matters will be disturbed only when, on 
review of the record, we can say that the district court abused 
its permiBBible discretion. 
535 F.2d at 1324-25 (footnotes omitted). 
103. Proposed Rule 1.11 Comment, 68 A.B.A.J. 1331 (1982). 
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be against public policy to restrict the private practice of former 
government lawyers, except in circumstances of actual conflicts 
of interest or potential breaches of the privilege of confi-
dentiality. 
Removing the "appearance of impropriety" from the ethical 
code governing the private practice of former government law-
yers equates their duties with the ethical responsibilities of all 
lawyers.104 There is no legitimate reason why the ABA Code 
should stigmatize former government lawyers and essentially 
jeopardize their careers after leaving government service. The 
"appearance of impropriety" is an unjustifiable standard that 
creates the assumption that "government lawyers" cannot be 
trusted to discharge their public responsibilities faithfully while 
in office, or to abide fully by screening procedures afterwards. lOll 
Subsection (a) of proposed Rule 1.11 permits lawyers who have 
served the government to practice in another capacity. The pro-
posed rule allows the revolving door lawyer to pursue a post-
government service career cognizant of his ethical and legal du-
ties, rather than confused by the undefined standard of impro-
priety conceived by a court. 
Subsection (b) of MRPC Rule 1.11 is an unique addition to 
the final draft which incorporates MCPR Canon 4's protection 
of client-attorney confidences. The subsection prohibits a former 
government lawyer who has gained knowledge of confidential 
government information about a person from representing a pri-
vate client whose interests are adverse to that person in a matter 
in which the information is material. loe 
Subsection (c) of the proposed rule incorporates MCPR Ca-
104. Letter from Donald A. Fanner to Barbara Mance (August TT, 1982). Mr. 
Farmer expressed his opinion that former government lawyers often are called upon to 
deal with ethical constraints arising out of confiict of interest principles because of their 
past involvement in important public responsibilities. 
105. Brief of Certain Lawyers as Amici Curiae on Rehearing En Bane, Amlstrong v. 
McAlpin, No. 79-7042, at 2 (1980). 
106. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUCT Rule 1.11(b)(e) (Final Draft 1982). 
This ban on the use of confidential government information in private practice disquali-
fies an individual lawyer; likewise, a firm is disqualified unless the lawyer is screened and 
given no share of the fees generated. These measures must be approved by the adverse 
party. Confidential information is defined in subsection (e) as information which the gov-
ernment is prohibited by law from disclosing to the public or has a legal privilege Dot to 
disclose. 
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non 5's proscription of a former government lawyer "switching 
sides" or representing adverse interests in a matter. The rule is 
carefully drafted to prohibit a government lawyer's: (1) partici-
pation in a matter in which he or she participated personally 
and substantially while in nongovernment employment unless 
under the law no one may act in the lawyer's place; and, (2) ne-
gotiation for private employment with any person involved in a 
matter in which the lawyer is participating personally and 
substantially. 107 
This study of proposed Rule l.11(b) and (c) demonstrates 
that the Kutak Commission has preserved the Code's Discipli-
nary Rules of Canon 4 and Canon 5 in the proposed regulation 
of the ethical restraints on the private practice of former govern-
ment lawyers. First, the rule prohibits a former government law-
yer from revealing or using, to his private client's advantage, in-
formation he acquired while a government employee. The 
prohibition of subsection (b) is clear and focuses on the preser-
vation of the client-attorney privilege which is the emphasis of 
the proposed Model Rules. lOS A lawyer has a duty to a client or 
former client of utmost loyalty and confidentiality, now recog-
nized in the ABA proposed regulation of the private practice of 
former government lawyers. 109 
Second, the prohibition of subsection (c) enforces MCPR 
Canon 5's application when former government lawyers "switch 
sides" in passing through the revolving door. The proposed rule 
protects the public from former government lawyers' "structur-
ing their government service to advance their own careers in the 
private sector and ... [incurring) the appearance of evil."llo If 
approved by the ABA House of Delegates, this section will serve 
to protect the integrity of government decision making, III as a 
prophylactic measure to guard against misuse of authority by 
government lawyers. "1 III 
107. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.11(c) (Final Draft 1982). 
108. Kutak, The New Model Rules of Professional Conduct, A Report to the Bar, 
68 A.B.A.J. at 1020: "No fundamental professional value assumed larger importance in 
the commission's work than that of client-lawyer confidentiality." 
109. Kutak, A Commitment to Clients and the Law, 68 A.B.A.J. 804, 805 (1982). 
110. Formal Op. 342, supra note 22, at 3. 
111. Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 105, at 5. 
112. 606 F.2d at 34. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
In light of Congress' passage of the Ethics in Government 
Act and the ABA's failure to justify DR9-101(B) under the stan-
dard of avoiding "the appearance of impropriety," the bar needs 
to adopt a clear conflict-of-interest ethical precept to regulate 
the private practice of former government attorneys. The vague 
standard of "appearance of professional impropriety" should not 
govern the private practice of former government lawyers. Nor 
should that standard serve to impute the disqualification of a 
former government attorney to an entire law firm when there is 
no evidence of actual impropriety. The bar should articulate 
with precision conflicts of interest. Proposed Rule 1.11 clearly 
establishes for the individual lawyer what will constitute unethi-
cal activity relating to post-government employment. The entry 
of government attorneys into private practice has become an oc-
currence of significant magnitude to warrant the bar's and fed-
eral courts' recognition of its facility unfettered by an out-dated 
and unrealistic ethical standard incomprehensible to lawyers. 
MRPC Rule 1.11 fulfills the Kutak Commission's goals to 
identify clearly the ABA's ethical objectives in the practice of 
law that guided the drafting of the Model Rules. Rule 1.11 is 
comprehensible, consistent with other rules in the proposed 
Model Rules, and compatible with current law. The rule is 
drafted clearly to prescribe the disqualification of an individual 
lawyer and a firm when the former government lawyer's disqual-
ification is imputed to that firm. The rule extols the ethical prin-
ciples of client confidentiality which are upheld consistently in 
the MRPC. Rule 1.11 is also consistent with the MCPR's disci-
plinary rules and Opinion 342's rejection of the appearance of 
impropriety as a standard, test or element embodied in the dis-
qualification of revolving door lawyers. It parallels federal law 
and regulation and, therefore, is congruent with the federal sys-
tem. Moreover, Rule 1.11 provides for a firm's disqualification, 
an issue Congress reserved for regulation by the bar itself. 
The most compelling reason for adoption of Rule 1.11 is its 
elimination of the "appearance of professional impropriety" gov-
erning the practice of former government lawyers. Removal of 
this vague and arbitrary standard will allow lawyers to pass 
through the revolving door with reasonable certainty of pro-
scribed conduct which could result in personal or firm disqualifi-
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cation. The proposed Rule 1.11 preserves the highest ethical 
standards of confidentiality and loyalty to a client or former cli-
ent. Its provisions embody the policy considerations of the gov-
ernment's need to employ qualified attorneys who are not penal-
ized professionally and financially when they exit the revolving 
door to private practice. Adoption of Rule 1.11 will be an effica-
cious reform to the body of ethics governing the employment of 
former government lawyers. 
Barbara G. Mance* 
• Third year student, Golden Gate University School of Law. 
28
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 2 [1983], Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol13/iss2/4
